Polluting the Plain Meaning of Policy Exclusions

The scope of the pollution exclusion in liability policies continues to be a highly-contested insurance coverage issue. One of the more recent debates in this area is whether the pollution exclusion’s application is limited to “traditional environmental pollution” or whether the exclusion should be afforded its plain and ordinary meaning, similar to other policy exclusions. The Vermont Supreme Court recently sided with insurers on this issue, holding that a policy’s pollution exclusion should be treated with the same analysis as any other policy exclusion. In Whitney v. Vermont Mutual Ins. Co., the Vermont Supreme Court considered whether the policy’s pollution exclusion precluded coverage for an insureds’ home that was damaged as a result of spraying a pesticide, chlorpyrifos, to get rid of bed bugs. The Vermont Supreme Court ultimately ruled that “pollution exclusions are not presumed, as a class, to be ambiguous or to be limited in their application to traditional environmental pollution” and, therefore, coverage was precluded.

In Whitney, the insureds had their house sprayed corner to corner with the pesticide chlorpyrifos, in order to exterminate bed bugs. Subsequent testing revealed large levels of the chemical remained inside, which prevented the insureds from returning to the house. As a result, the insureds filed a claim under their homeowners’ policy, which the insurer subsequently denied due to the policy’s pollution exclusion.

In the ensuing coverage action, the trial court ruled that the terms “pollution” and “discharge, dispersal, release, and escape” were ambiguous and should therefore be construed in favor of coverage. This court relied on a 2003 California Supreme Court decision in MacKinnon v. Truck Insurance Exchange, which held that pollution exclusions are ambiguous in nature and should only apply to traditional environmental disasters.

On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed with the insurer and determined that pollution exclusions are not presumed to be ambiguous or limited to traditional environmental pollution. The court relied on its recent 2015 opinion in Cincinnati Specialty Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Energy Wise Homes, Inc., a similar pollution exclusion case involving airborne chemicals and residues from spray-foam insulation. Here, the court noted it was evident that there was a “discharge, dispersal, release, and escape” of the chlorpyrifos within the insured’s home and thus the claim fell squarely within the policy’s exclusion.

Moving forward, jurisdictions that do not have well-established law on the application of the pollution exclusion to indoor exposures will inevitably be faced with arguments over the scope of the exclusion. Insureds will continue to press, as they did in the Vermont Supreme Court, that the pollution exclusion is ambiguous and/or not intended to apply to non-traditional environmental harm. The majority of recent decisions have favored insurers, but it is clear that these arguments will continue to result in more ground-breaking decisions across the country.